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FISHER v. CITY OF BERKELEY: 
APPLYING DUE PROCESS AND 
PREEMPTION TO RENT 
CONTROL ORDINANCES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Fisher v. City of Berkeley,1 the California Supreme 
Court addressed the validity of Berkeley's latest rent control or-
dinance. 2 With the exception of a retaliatory eviction provision,3 
the court upheld the ordinance against all challenges.' These 
challenges included alleged due process violations,1I and claims 
that certain provisions in the ordinance were preempted by state 
law.6 
The Fisher court discussed five relevant issues: 1) the facial 
validity of the ordinance's rate of return standard;7 2) the facial 
1. 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984). 
2. Berkeley, Cal., Ordinance 5261-N.S., Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good 
Cause Ordinance (June 1980) [hereinafter cited as Ordinance]. 
3. Id. § 14. This section creates a presumption that any eviction within six months 
after a tenant has exercised his or her rights under the ordinance is retaliatory. Id. 
4. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 652, 693 P.2d at 669, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 690. The court also 
addressed two other issues that will not be discussed in this Note. In 1982, the United 
States Supreme Court held that municipalities were subject to antitrust scrutiny. Com-
munity Communications Co. v Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). Based upon the arguments 
raised in Boulder, Berkeley's landlords attacked the ordinance as violating the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 655, 693 P.2d at 271, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 692. The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address that issue, and decided that 
Berkeley's ordinance did not violate antitrust laws. See Fisher v. Berkeley, No. 84-1538, 
slip op. at 9-10 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1986). The California Supreme Court also addressed an 
equal protection argument, but it summarily dismissed that argument as bearing a de-
batable rational relationship to the legitimate public purpose of the ordinance. Fisher, 37 
Cal. 3d at 684, 693 P.2d at 293, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 714. 
5. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a). "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law .... " Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. U[N]or 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law." Id. 
6. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7. uA county or city may make and enforce within its 
limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with 
general laws." Id. (Emphasis added.) 
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validity of the ordinance's rate adjustment procedures;8 3) 
whether the ordinance constitutes an unreasonable restraint on 
the alienation of property;9 4) the validity of the ordinance's re-
taliatory eviction provisions;Io and 5) the validity of the ordi-
nance's rent withholding provisions. ll This Note will analyze the 
Fisher court's thorough evaluation of each issue. Furthermore, 
this Note will consider the significance of future due process and 
preemption challenges to rent control in light of the Fisher 
decision. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Fisher decision arose when residential landlords in the 
City of Berkeley challenged the validity of Berkeley's rent con-
trol ordinance, and sued for injunctive and declaratory relief. I2 
The landlords raised concerns regarding the ordinance's formula 
for establishing and adjusting rents, its ultimate effect on the 
value of rental properties, and the validity of certain provisions 
established to ensure compliance with the ordinance.I3 To pro-
tect their interests, the landlords brought an action charging 
that the ordinance either violated their guarantee of due process 
or that the ordinance was preempted by state law. I" 
to the validity of the ordinance's formula for setting and adjusting rent levels. 
8. [d. at 687, 693 P.2d at 295, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716. This issue refers to the validity 
of the procedures established by the ordinance for implementing the rate of return 
standard. 
9. [d. at 691, 693 P.2d at 299, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 720. This issue refers to the potential 
preemption of provisions in the ordinance by California Civil Code § 711, which prohib-
its restraints on alienation; the provisions in the ordinance restrict rent adjustments that 
are necessary to cover cost increases resulting from the sale or refinancing of rental prop-
erty acquired after adoption of the ordinance. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1982). 
10. Fisher at 693, 693 P.2d at 300, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 721. This issue refers to the 
potential preemption of a provision in the ordinance by California Evidence Code § 500, 
which allocates burdens of proof. CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 (West 1966). There are provi-
sions in the ordinance that purport to protect tenants from evictions by landlords who 
retaliate against tenants who exercise their rights under the ordinance. One provision 
establishes a presumption regarding retaliatory evictions, and this issue refers to the va-
lidity of that provision. See supra note 3. 
11. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 699, 693 P.2d at 304, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725. This issue refers 
to the due process and preemption challenges to the use of rent withholding by tenants 
to force landlords to comply with the ordinance. 
12. [d. at 653, 693 P.2d at 270, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 691. 
13. See generally id. at 679-709, 693 P.2d at 289-312, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 710-33. 
14. [d. 
2
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Both due process and preemption are doctrines that have 
different meanings depending on the circumstances of each 
case. 11I Generally, due process ensures that statutory procedures 
and purposes, at all levels of government, are "reasonable" 
under the circumstances. IS Preemption, on the other hand, is a 
limitation on inferior governmental entities that regulate in con-
flict with the statutory schemes of superior governmental enti-
ties. I7 In Fisher, the court applied these doctrines to the specific 
provisions of Berkeley's rent control ordinance. IS 
15. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960). "Due process is an elusive concept. 
Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual 
contexts." Id. at 442. See also In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 
(1962). "[Wlhether the state has fully occupied a field with respect to any given subject 
depends upon considerations which will necessarily vary and must therefore be deter-
mined in every case .... " Id. at 110, 372 P.2d at 899, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 859. 
16. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
If the laws passed seem to have a reasonable relation to a 
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor dis-
criminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied ... 
Price control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitu-
tional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably ir-
relevent to the policy the legislature is free to adopt .... 
Id. at 537-39. Nebbia is regarded as the first case in which the United States Supreme 
Court abandoned the philosophy of economic due process, where regulated businesses 
had to be affected with a public interest before a regulation would be considered legiti-
mate. See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 245 (1941). In Nebbia, the Court repudiated 
its prior strict scrutiny approach to economic regulations, and declared that it would 
defer to the legislature unless a particular legislation was not rationally related to a legit-
imate public purpose. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537. 
17. See Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles. 60 Cal. 2d 276, 384 
P.2d 158, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1963). 
The doctrine of state preemption becomes a determining fac-
tor only when a political subdivision (not necessarily a 
chartered city) attempts to legislate under its admitted police 
power [CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 111 on a subject that the state 
also has legislated upon. The question then arises as to 
whether the subject matter of the legislation has not been pre-
empted by the state. 
60 Cal. 2d at 292 n.ll, 384 P.2d at 168 n'l1' 32 Cal. Rptr. at 840 n.l1. 
18. In order to facilitate a due process analysis, the general purposes of the ordi-
nance are as follows: 
[Tlo regulate residential rent increases in the City of Berkeley 
and to protect tenants from unwarranted rent increases and 
arbitrary, discriminatory, or retaliatory evictions, in order to 
help maintain the diversity of the Berkeley community and to 
ensure compliance with legal obligations relating to rental 
housing. This legislation is designed to address the City of 
Berkeley's housing crisis, preserve the public peace, health 
and safety, and advance the housing policies of this City with 
regard to low and fixed income persons, minorities, students, 
3
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The first group of provisions considered by the court deals 
with the ordinance's rate of return standard. IS The rate of return 
standard, or "fair return standard," establishes a formula for 
setting and adjusting rent ceilings.20 In Berkeley's ordinahce, 
that formula is administered by a regulatory board that is re-
quired to apply the formula in different ways depending upon 
the prevailing circumstances.21 The most important section of 
the ordinance states, "No provision of this Ordinance shall be 
applied so as to prohibit the Board from granting an individual 
rent adjustment that is demonstrated necessary by the landlord 
to provide the landlord with a fair return on investment."22 One 
handicapped, and the aged. 
See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 3. 
19. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 679, 693 P.2d at 289, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 710. 
20. See generally Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a 
Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 781-817 (1983). The term "fair return standard" refers 
to the United States Supreme Court's declaration that failure to provide a fair return is 
a taking of property without due process of law. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546-47 
(1898). There are an infinite number of potential rate of return formulas including: the 
maintenance of cash flow, the return on value, the percentage net operating income, the 
return on investment, and the maintenance of net operating income. See generally Baar, 
supra at 781-817. The use of various rate of return standards has been routinely ac-
cepted by the courts; in Fisher, the court reiterated, "[S)election of an administrative 
standard by which to set rent ceilings is a task for local governments-in this cases the 
voters themselves-and not the courts." Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 681, 693 P.2d at 291, 209 
Cal. Rptr. at 712. The court also added that, " '[R)ent control agencies are not obliged by 
either the state or federal Constitution to fix rents by application of any particular 
method or formula.' " [d. at 680, 693 P.2d at 290, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 711 (citing Carson 
Mobilehome Park Owner's Assn. v. City of Cltrson, 35 Cal. 3d 184, 191, 672 P.2d 1297, 
1300, 197 Cal. Rptr. 284, 287 (1983». 
21. See generally Ordinance, supra note 2. Section 6 of the ordinance established a 
nine member regulatory board and sets out its powers, duties, rules and procedures. [d. § 
6. Section 11 provides: 
[d. § 11(b). 
In adjusting ceilings under this subsection, the Board shall 
adopt a formula or formulas of general application. This 
formula will be based upon the annual rent registration forms, 
surveys, information and testimonies presented at public hear-
ings, and other available data indicating increases or decreases 
in the expenses relating to the rental housing market in the 
City of Berkeley set forth in this subsectioon. 
22. [d. § 12(i). Berkeley's standard is actually a hybrid of the return on investment 
and maintenance of net operating income standards. The return on investment standard 
is calculated as follows: gross rent = operating expenses + mortgage payments + cash 
investments. The maintenance of net operating income standard is calculated as follows: 
gross rent = base date gross rent + (current operating expenses - base date operating 
expenses). Baar, supra note 20, at 784. Berkeley's ordinance, in §§ 10 and 11, established 
a base rent income and required adjustments to cover increases in costs, i.e., a mainte-
nance of net operating income approach where actual profits stay the same. See Ordi-
nance, supra note 2, §§ 10, 11. Section 12, on the other hand, provides, "It is the intent 
4
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of the major issues that faced the Fisher court was to determine 
whether a fair return on investment is valid under the due pro-
cess clause. 
A similar group of provisions challenged by the landlords is 
the rent adjustment procedures.23 In order to implement the 
rate of return standard, the ordinance includes certain mecha-
nisms which may be used by the Regulatory Board.24 One mech-
anism is the general or citywide adjustment, which allows the 
Board to grant adjustments to general categories of residential 
properties. 211 Another mechanism is the adjustment by individual 
petition.2s This method, however, is more time consuming then 
the general adjustment, and the landlords attacked the potential 
delay as violating their guarantee of due process.27 
Another alleged due process violation regarded the ordi-
nance's rent withholding provisions.28 These provisions allow a 
tenant to withhold rents whenever a landlord does not comply 
with the ordinance.29 Specifically, tenants are allowed to with-
of this Ordinance that individual upward adjustments in the rent ceilings on units be 
made only when the landlord demonstrates that such adjustments are necessary to pro-
vide the landlord with a fair return on investment." Id. § 12(c)(10). 
23. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 687, 693 P.2d at 295, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716. 
24. See Ordinance, supra note 2, §§ 11, 12. 
25. Id. § l1(a) which provides in part: "Once each year, the Board shall consider 
setting and adjusting the rent ceiling for all rental units covered by this Ordinance in 
general and/or particular categories of rental units covered by this Ordinance deemed 
appropriate by the Board." Id. 
26. Id. § 12(a) which provides in part: "Upon receipt of a petition by a landlord 
and/or tenant, the rent ceiling of individual controlled rental units may be adjusted up-
ward or downward in accordance with the procedures set forth elsewhere in this Sec-
tion." Id. 
27. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 687, 693 P.2d at 295, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716. "Property may 
be as effectively taken by long-continued and unreasonable delay in putting an end to 
confiscatory rates as by express affirmance of them .... " Id. (citing Smith v. Illiinois 
Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591 (1926». 
28. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 699, 693 P.2d at 304, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725. 
29. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 15(a)(I), (a)(2). 
If a landlord fails to register in accordance with Section 8 of 
this Ordinance, or if a landlord demands, accepts, receives or 
retains any payment in excess of the maximum allowable rent 
permitted by this Ordinance, a tenant may take any or all of 
the following actions until compliance is achieved: (1) A ten-
ant may petition the Board for appropriate relief. If the 
Board, after the landlord has proper notice and after a hear-
ing, determines that a landlord has willfully and knowingly 
failed to register a rental unit covered by this Ordinance or 
5
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hold rents if landlords fail to comply with the ordinance's rent 
ceilings so or with the ordinance's registration requirements.3t 
The basis of the landlords' argument was that the tenants were 
not qualified to interpret the ordinance, or to determine whether 
or not the landlords had complied with it.s2 Alternatively, the 
landlords pointed to certain state statutes that govern rent with-
holding, and claimed that these statutes preempt the ordi-
nance's rent withholding provisions.ss 
According to the landlords, other ordinance provisions were 
preempted by state law. The Berkeley landlords were concerned 
about the ordinance's effect on the sale and financing of rental 
property, and therefore, they argued that certain provisions in 
the ordinance created an unreasonable restraint on the aliena-
tion of property.s, Specifically, the landlords pointed to provi-
sions in the ordinance which establish that a landlord-owner 
may not obtain a rent increase based upon increased carrying 
costs arising out of a recent sale or a refinancing of rental prop-
erty.311 It was the landlords' contention that this result was ex-
[d. 
violated the provisions of Sections 10, 11 and 12 of this Ordi-
nance, the Board may authorize the tenant of such rental unit 
to withhold all or a portion of the rent for the unit until such 
time as the rental unit is brought into compliance with this 
Ordinance . . . . (2) A tenant may withhold up to the full 
amount of his or her periodic rent which is charged or de-
manded by the landlord under the provisions of this Ordi-
nance. In any action to recover possession based on nonpay-
ment of rent, possession shall not be granted where the tenant 
has withheld rent in good faith under this Section. 
30. [d. § 10. This section provides for a base rent ceiling that sets ceilings at those 
rents being charged as of May 31, 1980. [d. Changes in those rent ceilings are governed 
by the general and individual adjustment mechanisms contained in §§ 11 and 12 of the 
ordinance. ld. §§ 11, 12. 
31. [d. § 8. This section requires landlords to register with the Board, to provide 
certain specified information, and to pay a registration fee for each unit. ld. 
32. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 699-704,693 P.2d at 304-08, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725-29. 
33. ld. at 704-09, 693 P.2d at 308-12, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 729-32. 
34. ld. at 691, 693 P.2d at 299, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 720. 
35. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 12(d), (e). These sections provide in full: 
(d) No individual upward adjustment of a rent ceiiling shall be 
authorized by the Board by reason of increased interest or 
other expenses resulting from the landlord's refinancing the 
rental unit if, at the time the landlord refinanced, the landlord 
could reasonably have foreseen that such increased expenses 
could not be covered by the rent schedule then in existence. 
except where such refinancing is necessary for the landlord to 
6
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pressly prohibited by state law.36 
The landlords also claimed that a retaliatory eviction provi-
sion in the Berkeley ordinance is in direct conflict with state 
law. 37 This provision establishes a presumption that any eviction 
within six months of a tenant's assertion of rights under the or-
dinance is retaliatory.38 Of all the due process and preemption 
challenges raised in Fisher, only this retaliatory eviction pre-
sumption was struck down by the California Supreme Court.39 
After discussing the five relevant issues of the case separately, 
the court severed the retaliatory eviction presumption from the 
rest of the ordinance.·o 
III. THE COURT'S DECISION 
[d. 
The Fisher court analyzed a number of issues challenged on 
make capital improvements which meet the criteria set forth 
in Section 12(c)(3). This paragraph shall only apply to that 
portion of the increased expenses resulting from the refinanc-
ing that were reasonably foreseeable at the time of the refi-
nancing of the rental unit and shall only apply to rental units 
refinanced after the date of adoption of this Ordinance. 
(e) Except for cases of individual hardship as set forth in Sub-
section 12(i) of this Ordinance, no individual upward adjust-
ment of a rent ceiling shall be authorized by the Board be-
cause of the landlord's increased interest or other expenses 
resulting from the sale of the property, if at the time the land-
lord acquired the property, the landlord could have reasonably 
foreseen that such increaaed expenses would not be covered by 
the rent schedule then in effect. This Subsection [12(e)] shall 
only apply to rental units acquired after the date of adoption 
of this Ordinance. 
36. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 692, 693 P.2d at 299, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 720. 
37. [d. at 693, 693 P.2d at 300, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 72l. 
38. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. This section provides in part: 
In an action by or against a tenant, evidence of the aasertion 
or exercise by the tenant of rights under this Ordinance within 
six months prior to the alleged act of retaliation shall create a 
presumption that the landlord's act was retaliatory. "Pre-
sumption" means that the Court must find the existence of 
the fact presumed unless and until its nonexistence is proven 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 
[d. This retaliatory eviction provision was amended in 1982 when Berkeley enacted the 
Tenant's Rights Amendment Act of 1982 in order to revise certain sections of the 
ordinance. 
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either due process or preemption grounds. The ordinance's rate 
of return standard, the rate adjustment procedures, and certain 
rent withholding provision were attacked by the Berkeley land-
lords as violative of due process.u Additionally, the landlords al-
leged that the retaliatory eviction presumption, the provision 
precluding a rent increase due to increased costs arising out of a 
recent sale or refinancing, and certain rent withholding provi-
sions were preempted by state law.42 The court applied a differ-
ent due process and preemption analysis to the various chal-
lenged ordinance provisions. 
A. FACIAL VALIDITY OF THE ORDINANCE'S RATE OF 
RETURN STANDARD 
The landlords contended that the return on investment 
standard in the Berkeley ordinance violated their due process 
rights.43 The court based its determination of whether the ordi-
nance violated the landlords' guarantee of due process primarily 
upon its definition of the term "investment." Unless the land-
lords could have shown that the return on investment standard 
was unreasonable, the court could not have found that the stan-
dard was a confiscation of property without due process of law!· 
The court began its analysis by stating, "[W]hether rental 
regulations are fair or confiscatory depends ultimately on the re-
sult reached."411 Nevertheless, the court was willing to consider a 
facial challenge to the ordinance in order to determine whether 
its terms would permit those who administered it, to avoid con-
fiscatory results in its actual application.46 The court decided 
that if the return on investment standard would afford sufficient 
flexibility in its administration and avoided confiscatory results, 
it would uphold the ordinance.47 
41. [d. at 679-709, 693 P.2d at 289-312, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 710-33. 
42. [d. 
43. [d. at 679, 693 P.2d at 289, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 710. Although most of the ordi-
nance established a maintenance of net operating income standard, § 12(8) explains that 
it is the purpose of the ordinance to grant upward rent adjustments only to ensure land-
lords a fair return on investment. See supra note 22. 
44. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
45. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 679, 693 P.2d at 289, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 710-11. 
46. [d. at 679, 693 P.2d at 290, 209 Cal. Rtpr. at 710. 
47. [d. at 682, 693 P.2d at 291, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 712. 
8
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The landlords argued that a fair rate of return must be 
based on the fair market value of their properties rather than 
upon the investment they personally put into those properties.48 
Some of the landlords had significant equity in their real estate 
with little or no investment,49 and they feared that the return on 
investment standard would leave them with little or no rental 
income; the landlords were concerned that any reasonable inter-
pretation of the term investment would lead to a confiscatory 
result.60 The court, however, disagreed with this interpretation 
of the investment standard, and rejected the claim that a return 
on value standard was required by the ordinance.1Il 
Significantly, the court found that the ordinance does not 
confine investment to a restrictive interpretation. 52 It asserted 
that, in appropriate cases, the Board may consider a landlord's 
personal labor in improving his property as an investment. 53 
Furthermore, the court explained that if a landlord has acquired 
his property by gift or inheritance, there is nothing in the ordi-
48. [d. at 680-81, 693 P.2d at 290-91, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 711-12. 
49. [d. at 685, 693 P.2d at 294, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 715. In this context, "equity" means 
an interest in property in excess of claims or liens (such as mortgage indebtedness) 
against it; "investment" refers to an expenditure of money for income or profit-a capi-
tal outlay. 
50. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 685, 693 P.2d at 294, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 715. 
51. [d. at 680-85, 693 P.2d at 290-94, 209 Cal. Rptr. 711-15. The return on value 
standard determines fair return by focusing on the market value of a landlord's property; 
this standard was first used in a railroad rate regulation case in which the United States 
Supreme Court held that railroads were entitled to rates sufficient to produce a fair re-
turn on the market value of their assets. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 547 (1898). How-
ever, the holding in Smyth was rejected in a utility rate regulation case in which the 
Court stated that, "[R)ates cannot be made to depend upon 'fair value' when the value 
of the going enterprise depends on earnings under whatever rates may be anticipated." 
Power Commission v. Hope Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944). The Fisher court, after 
quoting this language from Hope Gas explained, "Implicit in this statement is the sug-
- gestion that a return on fair value standard is circular and unworkable." Fisher, 37 Cal. 
3d at 681 n.33, 693 P.2d at 290 n.33, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 711 n.33. 
The value of any income producing asset is a function of its earning potential; just 
as a bond providing 1O~;, interest every year is more valuable than an identical bond 
providing only 5~;, in interest each year, a rental property producing $100 each month is 
more valuable than a similar property producing only $50 each month. If a potential 
buyer were to consider purchasing the two properties, he would logically consider the $50 
difference in income each month in determining what he was willing to pay for the prop-
erty; a logical buyer would be willing to pay up to the present value of the $50 difference 
each month on top of the original value of the first property. See Baar, supra note 20, at 
798-803. 
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nance to preclude the Board from using the transferor's invest-
ment in the property to determine the landlord's investment.54 
Moreover, the court contended that the Board was not prohib-
ited from considering certain forms of investment such as mort-
gage payments toward principal, or cash later invested to Im-
prove the property.1I11 
The return on investment standard was also attacked by the 
landlords as unfairly depriving them of the full long term appre-
ciation value of their properties.1I8 In making this argument, the 
landlords tried to establish that they were entitled to the full 
market value of their rentals, if the properties were earning 
rents at a competitive market rate.1I7 As argued by the landlords, 
they were entitled to the full capitalization value of their proper-
ties, which is calculated by factoring the present value of rental 
income to be earned in the future and combining that with the 
properties' intrinsic land value.1I8 
The court rejected this contention, and premised its analy-
sis upon "taking" cases that have upheld regulations except if an 
owner has been deprived of "substantially all reasonable use of 
the property."119 As explained by the coUrt, some lessening of ap-
preciation is a necessary result of rent control because apprecia-
tion is often a function of increased rental income.8o The court 
stated, "It is one of the very sources of long-term apprecia-
tion-inflated rents-that rent control measures are intended to 
restrict. "81 
In a similar argument, the landlords requested the court to 
54. [d. 
55. [d. Ultimately, the court decided that the return on investment standard is flexi-
ble enough to allow the Board to avoid confiscatory results in the standard's application. 
[d. 
56. [d. This is the same as demanding a fair return on value standard instead of a 
fair return on investment. See Comment, Rethinking Rent Control: An Analysis of "Fair 
Return," 12 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 640 (1981). See also supra note 51 (explaining the rela-
tionship between property value and the potential rental income from that property). 
57. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 685, 693 P.2d at 294, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 715. 
58. [d. See also supra note 51. 
59. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 686, 693 P.2d at 294, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 715 (citing Agins v. 
City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 277, 598 P.2d 25, 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 378 (1979». 
60. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 685, 693 P.2d at 294, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 715. 
61. [d. (citing Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati, 148 Cal. App. 3d 
280, 290, 195 Cal. Rptr. 825, 832 (1983». 
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find that, as a matter or law, investment should include the ef-
fect of inflation on the landlords' initial investment.62 One sec-
tion in the ordinance sets rent levels at the rents being charged 
as of May 31, 1~80;63 the landlords argued that unless the invest-
ment standard would be interpreted to include the effect of in-
flation, their profits would steadily erode over time.6" As noted 
by the court, if a fixed profit amount eventually loses real value, 
that result is potentially just as confiscatory as if the Board had 
set its own confiscatory rate.61i 
Although the court refused to invalidate the ordinance be-
cause the ordinance failed to account for the effect of inflation, 
the court basically accepted the landlords' inflation argument.66 
The court's reasoning, however, prompted it to reach the oppo-
site conclusion from that of the landlords; rather than using the 
absence of inflation language as a means of criticizing the ordi-
nance, the court pointed to this omission as providing the Board 
with sufficient flexibility to avoid confiscatory results.67 The 
court found that it was not apparent that the ordinance pre-
cluded the application of necessary adjustments to account for 
inflation.68 Furthermore, it was even less clear that the Board 
would decline to invoke its powers to adjust individual profit 
amounts. The court explained, " '[I]t is to be presumed that the 
board will exercise its powers in conformity with the require-
ments of the Constitution; and if it does act unfairly, the fault 
lies with the board and not the statute.' "69 
62. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 682, 693 P.2d at 292, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 713. 
63. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 10. 
64. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 682, 693 P.2d at 291-92, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13. If land-
lords' profits were fixed at the 1980 level, the real value of those profits would diminish 
over time; $1,000 of purchasing power in 1980, given, for example, an inflation rate of 
1O~';" would buy only $100 of the same goods 10 years into the future. 
65. [d. at 683, 693 P.2d at 292, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 713. The court stated, "[Ajlthough 
defendants' ordinance may properly restrict landlords' profits on their rental invest-
ments, it may not indefinitely freeze the dollar amount of those profits without eventu-
ally causing confiscatory results." [d. (Emphasis in original.) 
66. [d. at 684, 693 P.2d at 293, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 714. 
67. [d. 
68. [d. 
69. [d. (citing Butterworth v. Boyd, 12 Cal. 2d 140, 149, 82 P.2d 434, 439 (1938». 
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B. THE FACIAL VALIDITY OF THE ORDINANCE'S RATE 
ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURES 
The court next decided the constitutional validity of the ad-
justment mechanisms used to implement the rate of return stan-
dard.70 A few years earlier, California's Supreme Court had con-
sidered the constitutionality of another Berkeley rent control 
ordinance, and had found that the adjustment procedures in 
that ordinance were confiscatory.71 According to that court, an 
adjustment mechanism "is sufficient for the required purpose 
only if it is capable of providing adjustments in maximum rents 
without a substantially greater incidence and degree of delay 
than is practically necessary. "72 
The Fisher court praised Berkeley's present ordinance, how-
ever, for correcting all of the problems of the prior ordinance.73 
The court decided that the current ordinance avoids the confis-
catory delays inherent in the prior ordinance's unit-by-unit pro-
cedure; the current ordinance provides for general citywide in-
creases to cover common costs that affect the entire city, thus 
avoiding the unnecessary delays inherent in hearing individual 
petitions.74 Additionally, for those peculiar situations that re-
quire review of individual petitions, the court found that the 
current ordinance's individual adjustment procedures are 
designed to assure reasonably prompt considerations of the 
landlords' claims.7I! 
According to the court, the original Berkeley ordinance 
placed the Regulatory Board in "a procedural strait jacket."76 
That ordinance did not allow petitions unless they were accom-
panied by building code compliance certificates, it gave the 
Board no power to consolidate petitions, and it gave the Board 
no power to delegate its authority to review petitions." On the 
70. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 687, 693 P.2d at 295, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716. 
71. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 173, 550 P.2d 1001, 1033, 130 Cal. 
Rptr. 465, 497 (1976). 
72. [d. at 169, 550 P.2d at 1030, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 494. 
73. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 690, 693 P.2d at 297, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 718. 
74. [d. at 691,693 P.2d at 298,209 Cal. Rptr. at 719 (citing Ordinance, supra note 2, 
§ 11). 
75. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 691, 693 P.2d at 298, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 719. 
76. [d. at 690, 693 P.2d at 297, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 718. 
77. [d. at 690, 693 P.2d at 298, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19. 
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contrary, the current ordinance requires the Board to consoli-
date petitions, make all adjustment decisions within 120 days, 
and appoint hearing officers if necessary.78 The result of these 
provisions, according to the court, is to provide the Board with 
sufficient flexibility to avoid confiscatory results.79 
C. WHETHER THE ORDINANCE CONSTITUTES AN UNREASONABLE 
RESTRAINT ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY 
Another issue considered by the court was whether the ordi-
nance constitutes an unreasonable restraint on the alienation of 
property.80 Specifically, the court considered the validity of pro-
visions that prevent the Board from granting a rent adjustment 
to cover increased costs arising from a recent sale or refinancing 
of rental property.81 The landlords argued that these provisions· 
unreasonably restrain alienation and are, therefore, directly pre-
empted by the California Civil Code.82 
The court not only rejected this preemption argument, but 
also upheld the provisions on due process, rational basis 
grounds.83 According to the court, the purpose of these provi-
sions is to prevent landlords from manipulating their costs in 
order to create a higher rental income.84 To prevent this result, 
two "antispeculation" clauses are included to prevent landlords 
from passing on to their tenants the cost of the landlords' specu-
lation in the housing market.81i The court concluded, "If this lat-
ter aspect were unregulated, use of the investment standard 
might defeat the purpose of rent price regulation. "86 
Additionally, the court considered whether the prOVISIons 
are directly preempted by the Civil Code.87 Section 711 of the 
Civil Code expressly prohibits restraints on the alienation of 
78. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 12. 
79. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 691, 693 P.2d at 299, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 720. 
80. Id. at 691, 693 P.2d at 299, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 720. 
81. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 12(d)(e). 
82. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1982). "Conditions restraining alienation, when re-
pugnant to the interest created, are void." Id. 




87. [d. at 692, 693 P.2d at 299, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 720. 
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property.88 Traditionally, however, this section has only applied 
to conditions in contracts of conveyance which are unreasonable 
restraints.89 In rejecting the preemption challenge in this area, 
the court found that the restraints in the ordinance are reasona-
ble, and ultimately, that section 711 of the Civil Code has no 
application to restraints created by local ordinances.9o 
The court noted that its review of the relevant section of 
the Civil Code revealed that the section was meant to address 
only private restraints on alienation, and was never intended to 
apply to municipal ordinances. According to the court, "[T]he 
rule against restraints on 'alienation is directed against the pro-
visions in contracts or conveyances. It has no application to disa-
bling restraints established by express statute.' " By interpeting 
"express statute" as including municipal ordinances, the court 
effectively dismissed any further preemption issue in this area. 
D. V ALIDITY OF THE ORDINANCE'S RETALIATORY 
EVICTION PRESUMPTION 
Another preemption argument raised by the landlords was 
that a provision in the ordinance that creates a presumption re-
garding retaliatory eviction, directly conflicts with California's 
Evidence Code.9s Most rent control ordinances contain retalia-
tory eviction provisions to protect tenants when they attempt to 
exercise their rights.94 One important protection is the general 
rule that a retaliatory eviction is a complete defense to an un-
lawful detainer action.911 Berkeley's ordinance reiterates this de-
fense, but adds a presumption that any eviction within six 
months of a tenant exercising rights created by the ordinance is 
88. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1982). 
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 15.2 (1977). See also Coast Bank v. 
Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 316, 392 P.2d 265, 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 508 (1964) (re-
straint in an equitable mortgage requiring consent by the creditor before the property 
could be transferred was found to be a reasonable restraint on alienation, and therefore, 
valid). 
90. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 693, 693 P.2d at 300, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 721. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. (citing 3 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL. LAW (8th ed. 1973) and RESTATEMENT OF 
PROPERTY §§ 403, 404 (1944)). 
93. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 694, 693 P.2d at 301, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 722. 
94. See Baar, supra note 20, at 833. 
95. Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 517, 476 P.2d 97, 103,90 Cal. Rptr. 
729, 735 (1970). 
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retaliatory.96 
The ordinance provides, "'Presumption' means that the 
Court must find the existence of the fact presumed unless and 
until its nonexistence is proven by a preponderance of the evi-
dence."97 In contrast, section 500 of the California Evidence 
Code states, "Except as otherwise provided by law a party has 
the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence 
of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is 
asserting. "98 Pointing to this language, the landlords argued that 
the rent control ordinance is directly preempted by the Evidence 
Code.99 
The court agreed, and found that the Evidence Code di-
rectly preempts the retaliatory eviction presumption.1oo In order 
to arrive at this conclusion, the court established that the ordi-
nance creates a presumption affecting the burden of proof as set 
forth in section 500 of the Evidence Code. As a basis for its con-
tention, the court relied upon two arguments used by the land-
lords. First, the language of the amended version of the ordi-
nance is almost identical to the language of the Evidence Code 
that defines a presumption affecting the burden of proof. IOI Sec-
ond, the city's attempt to support the presumption on public 
policy grounds indicates that the presumption is one affecting 
the burden of proof; the Evidence Code defines these presump-
tions as implementing some type of public policy.lo2 
96. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. 
97. See id. 
98. CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 (West 1966). This section refers to the party who has the 
burden of proof. [d. 
99. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 694, 693 P.2d at 301, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 722. 
100. [d. at 698, 693 P.2d at 304, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725. 
10l. CAL. EVID. CODE. § 606 (West 1966). This section states, "The effect of a pre-
sumption affecting the burden of proof is to impose upon the party against whom it 
operates the burden of proof as to the nonexistence of the presumed fact." [d. 
102. [d. § 605. A presumption affecting the burden of proof is intended to establish 
some public policy; a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence, on the 
other hand, is one intended to facilitate only the determination of the particular action 
in which it is applied, and is not intended to establish or implement any public policy. 
[d. § 603. It should be noted that the pre-amendment version of the ordinance contained 
a presumption completely identical to Evidence Code § 603 defining a presumption af-
fecting the burden of producing evidence. The change in language is another indication 
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Additionally, the court noted that the "[e]xcept as other-
wise provided by law" language of section 500 of the Evidence 
Codel03 combined with section 160 of the Evidence Code,104 fur-
ther indicates preemption. 1011 Section 160 of the Evidence Code 
defines "law" as including constitutional, statutory, and deci-
sionallaw.l06 Moreover, the court, relying on precedent, asserted 
that the legislature never intended municipal ordinances to be 
included in the exception for law provided in the Evidence 
Code.l07 Although the court pointed to cases in which other 
courts have suggested that the term statute may include local 
ordinances, the Fisher court decided that an ordinance is void to 
the extent that it purports to establish rules of evidence.l08 
E. VALIDITY OF THE ORDINANCE'S RENT WITHHOLDING 
PROVISIONS 
The landlords' final challenge was to the rent withholding 
provisions in the ordinance.l09 Two provisions in the ordinance 
allow tenants to withhold rents whenever landlords fail to com-
ply with either the rent ceilings in effect or with the ordinance's 
registration process.110 The landlords challenged these provisions 
on both due process and preemption grounds.11l 
1. The Due Process Challenge 
The Berkeley landlords aimed their due process challenge of 
the rent withholding provisions at the provision that allows a 
tenant to unilaterally withhold rents if a landlord fails to comply 
with the ordinance. ll2 Specifically, this provision allows a tenant 
to withhold rents, and provides that in an action to recover rents 
or possession, a landlord will be denied rent if he has failed to 
comply wiith the ordinance, and denied possession if the tenant 
103. See id. § 500 (West 1966). 
104. See id. § 160 (West 1966). 
105. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 698, 693 P.2d at 304, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725. 
106. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 160 (1966). 
107. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 698, 693 P.2d at 304, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725. 
108. [d. at 698, 693 P.2d at 303, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 724. 
109. [d. at 699, 693 P.2d at 304, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725. 
110. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 15(a)(1). 
111. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 699-709, 293 P.2d at 304-12, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725-32. 
112. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 15(a)(2). 
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has acted in good faith. ll3 
The due proceess challenge was made on several grounds. 
First, the landlords attacked the reasonableness of the provi-
sion. ll• In general, all provisions must be reasonably related to 
the purpose of an ordinance. lUI Second, the landlords claimed 
that the terms of the withholding provision are vague.1lS This 
challenge suggested that the ordinance's terms fail to provide 
notice of what would constitute a legal withholding of rents.ll7 
Third, the landlords argued that the rent withholding provision 
is confiscatory.118 The landlords claimed that they were being 
deprived of their rents without a fair hearing before a legitimate 
public authority.ll9 
Initially, the court decided that the rent withholding provi-
sion is reasonably related to the purposes of the ordinance. 
Under the ordinance, landlords are required to register their 
rental units with the Regulatory Board and are assessed a fee for 
each unit;120 these funds provide the Board with money to en-
force the ordinance.121 Unfortunately, if the landlords failed to 
register, the Board would be unable to function. The Berkeley 
ordinance, however, establishes that a tenant may withhold rent 
if a landlord does not register.122 Therefore, according to the 
court, the rent withholding provision is critical to ensure land-
lord registration; the registration process is rationally related to 
the ordinance's legitimate purposes.123 
The court also determined that the rent withholding provi-
113. See id. 
114. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 700, 693 P.2d at 305, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 726. 
115. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
116. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 702, 693 P.2d at 306, 209 Cal.Rptr. at 727. 
117. See generally Note, Due Progress Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 
62 HARV. L. REV. 77 (1948). 
118. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 703, 693 P.2d at 307, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 728. 
119. See Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1, 21, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904, 915 (1971) 
(explaining that due process of law requires that before a person is deprived of life, lib-
erty or property, he must be given notice of the proceeding against him, an opportunity 
to defend himself, and the deprivation must be in a manner consistent with essential 
fairness). 
120. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 6. 
121. See id. 
122. See id. § 15(a)(I), (a)(2). 'For the text of the relevant rent withholding provi-
sion, see supra note 29. 
123. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d. at 702, 693 P.2d at 306, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 727. 
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sion is not unconstitutionally vague.lU As explained by the 
court, it would uphold the provision if the provision gives fair 
notice to the landlords of their responsibilities regarding compli-
ance, and if it provides reasonably adequate standards to guide 
enforcement. 12Ii The court decided that the ordinance includes 
an adequate description of who may use the remedy, who deter-
mines whether a landlord has violated the ordinance, what 
amount may be withheld, and when the rent withholding should 
be discontinued. us 
Furthermore, the court found that under the Berkeley ordi-
nance, "tenant" is confined to a lessee, assignee, or sublessee 
who believes in "good faith" that he is being charged excessive 
rents or that he lives in an unregistered apartment.127 It also de-
termined that the final arbiter of whether a landlord has com-
plied with the ordinance is the trial court when the landlord 
sues to evict for nonpayment of rent.12S Moreover, the court con-
cluded that the ordinance clearly establishes that a tenant may 
withhold up to the full amount of periodic rent up until the trial 
court confirms that a landlord has complied with the ordi-
nance.129 According to the court, the terms of the ordinance pro-
vide adequate notice of the conduct required to comply with it, 
and establish reasonably adequate standards to guide 
enforcement.180 
Finally, the court ruled that the withholding provision does 
not create a confiscation of rent without due process; rather it 
provides a defense to an unlawful detainer action.18l The court 
stated, "[T]he applicability of the withholding provision and the 
qualified defense it confers comes into question only after the 
landlord has initiated a wrongful detainer action. The provision 
affords the landlord no less due process protection than he 
would have normally."182 The court concluded that, at most, the 
provision establishes a "substantive defense to unlawful detainer 
124. [d. at 703, 693 P.2d at 307, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 728. 
125. [d. at 702, 693 P.2d at 306, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 727. 





131. [d. at 704, 693 P.2d at 308, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 729. 
132. [d. at 704, 693 P.2d at 307, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 728. 
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actions as a means of ensuring compliance with the 
ordinance. "IS3 
2. The Preemption Challenge 
California has two different preemption doctrines in its con-
stitution: a general doctrine covering most cities, and a specific 
doctrine relating to chartered cities. ls4 Although Berkeley is a 
chartered city, the landlords conceded that rent control is a mu-
nicipal affair over which chartered cities are given exclusive 
power to legislate.1311 Thus, Berkeley is subject to the general 
rule that a city may make and enforce regulations that are not in 
conflict with general laws. 138 
, The Berkeley landlords argued that the rent withholding 
provisions are not only in direct conflict with general laws, and 
therefore, directly preempted, but that the provisions are also 
impliedly preempted by extensive state regulation in the area. lS7 
The landlords based their argument upon three specific statutes 
that they claimed occupy the field of "when rent is due."138 
However, the court rejected these preemption claims and con-
cluded that the rent withholding provisions are not actually rent 
withholding provisions, but substantive defenses to eviction 
suits. 139 
Initially, the court dealt with the direct preemption argu-
ment in terms of section 1161 of the California Code of Civil 
Procedure that describes when a person is guilty of unlawful de-
tainer.l(O Interestingly, the court dismissed the relevant provi-
133. Id. at 704, 693 P.2d at 308, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 729. 
134. CAL. CONST, art. XI, § 5(a). This section allows chartered cities to legislate ex-
clusively in areas considered "municipal affairs." Id. 
135. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 704, 693 P.2d at 308, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 729. See CAL CONST. 
art. XI, § 5(a). 
136. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
137. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 705, 693 P.2d at 308-09, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 729-30. 
138. 1) CAL. CIV. PRoe. CODE § 1161 (West 1982) (this section describes the circum-
stances under which a tenant is guilty of uhlawful detainer); 2) CAL. CIV. CODE § 1947 
(West 1985)(this section provides the timing for the payment of rent when there is no 
usage or contract to the contrary); and 3) CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 (West 1985) (this section 
provides circumstances under which a tenant may withhold rents in order to use them to 
repair deficiencies in the premises). 
139. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 706-09, 693 P.2d at 309-12, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 730-32. 
140. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1161 (West 1982). 
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sion as procedural, even though the court had already deter-
mined that the rent withholding provisions are substantive.141 
Additionally, the court rejected the landlords' contention that 
two other statutes are preemptive; the court determined that 
these statutes do not concern defenses to eviction suits.142 The 
court concluded, "[M]erely because defendants' ordinance 'im-
poses restraints which the State law does not, does not spell out 
a conflict between State and local law. On the contrary, the ab-
sence of a statutory restraint is the very occasion for municipal 
initiative.' "143 
The landlords' preemption by implication argument was 
similarly rejected by the court.144 In dismissing this preemption 
challenge, the court relied upon an established three step pre-
emption by implication analysis. HI! This analysis is based upon 
an examination of state statutes regulating the same field, their 
volume and content, and the effect of the local regulation on 
transient citizens.146 As noted by the court, coverage of the field 
of rent withholding is not complete enough to indicate that it 
has become an exclusive matter of state concern.147 Further-
more, neither the quantity nor the content of the statutes imply 
a legislative intent to occupy the field of rent withholding to the 
exclusion of municipally created defenses to unlawful detainer 
actions.148 Finally, rather than adversely affect transient citizens, 
to the extent they may be affected, the court found that the or-
dinance will probably have a positive effect on these 
individuals.149 
141. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 706, 693 P.2d at 309-10, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 730. 
142. Id. at 707, 693 P.2d at 310, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 731. 
143. Id. (citing Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 62 N.J. 521, _, 303 A.2d 298, 
307 (1973». 
144. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 707-09, 693 P.2d at 310-12, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 731-32. 
145. Id. at 708, 693 P.2d at 311, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 732 (citing Galvan v. Superior 
Court, 70 Cal. 2d 851, 859-60, 452 P.2d 930, 935-36, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642, 647-48 (1969». 
The three step analysis asks: 1) is the subject matter so fully and completely covered by 
general law so as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state 
concern; 2) has the subject matter been partially covered by general law and couched in 
terms that clearly indicate a paramount state concern which will tolerate no further local 
action; or 3) has the subject matter been partially covered by general law, and the sub-
ject is of such a nature that the adverse effect on the transient citizens of the state 
outweighs the possible benefits to the local community. [d. 
146. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
147. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 709, 693 P.2d at 311, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 732. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. This result was predestined by the court's determination that the rent with-
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The court's analysis of the due process and preemption 
challenges raised in Fisher demonstrates that only· in rare cir-
cumstances will the court strike down a rent control ordinance. 
The Fisher decision involved a variety of applications of due 
process and preemption. In general, there are two distinct ap-
proaches to analyzing due process and preemption,1110 and these 
approaches can be further divided. lII1 A due process attack may 
refer either to procedural due processl112 or to substantive due 
process. lila However, in both situations, a court's analysis is pri-
marily concerned with the reasonableness and essential fairness 
of the terms involved. 111. Preemption, on the other hand, may 
involve either a direct conflict with a state statute, or, in the 
case of preemption by implication, there may be certain factors 
that imply a legislative intent to exclusively occupy an area of 
law. 11111 
A. DUE PROCESS 
The court's due process analysis raised two important is-
sues: the reasonableness, or rational relationship of the terms of 
the ordinance to its legitimate purpose of regulating rents, and 
the distinction between procedural and substantive due process 
in the context of rent control. The court's discussion of these 
two issues demonstrates the limited future relevance of due pro-
cess challenges to rent control. 
Courts have consistently held that rent control is a reasona-
holding provisions are substantive defenses to eviction suits, and not procedural mecha-
nisms for confiscating the landlords' rents. 
150. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
151. See Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App. 3d 21, 94 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1971) (dividing 
due process into procedural and substantive due process). 
152. Id. Procedural due process refers to that limitation on permissable government 
activities that is primarily concerned with an individual's right to a fair hearing when-
ever his life, liberty or property may be lost. Id. 
153. Id. Substantive due process refers to that limitation on permissable govern-
mental activities directed at restricting legislation in areas that would infringe on an 
individual's life, liberty or property. Id. 
154. See supra note 16. 
155. See Comment, The California City versus Preemption By Implication, 17 
HASTINGS L.J. 603 (1966). 
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ble means for protecting local health and welfare, and that the 
objectives of rent control are a legitimate local concern, i.e., en-
suring a heterogenous housing market, .stabilizing rents, and pro-
viding shelter for the poor. IllS Therefore, the potential result of 
regulating private property justifies the exercise of the state's 
police power, and establishes rent control as a legitimate means 
for enforcing that result. 11l7 The court's conclusion that rent con-
trol is a legitimate means of enforcing local housing policy, how-
ever, reflects a general deference by the courts to economic legis-
lation rather than an assumption that rent control is a means of 
enforcing local housing policy.lII8 
Rent control ordinances are not uniform, and the rational 
relationship between the terms of an ordinance and its legiti-
mate purpose raises a number of due process issues. Generally, if 
there is any conceivable rationale for upholding economic legis-
lation, the courts will do so.lII9 However, the Fisher court did 
provide some guidelines as to when rent control ordinance provi-
sions will be rationally related to their legitimate purposes. 
When discussing the ordinance's rate of return standard, 
the court referred to what constitutes a "reasonable" rate of re-
turn to landlords. When an economist discusses business costs, 
he includes in those costs, the return that can be made if a busi-
ness' capital were invested in another enterprise with similar 
risks and information costs-the business' opportunity costs. ISO 
This type of analysis accounts for the fact that if an investor can 
earn more in another enterprise with comparable costs, it would 
be illogical for him to remain in an enterprise earning less. When 
an ordinance ties its rate of return to investment, its meaning is 
156. See generally Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 
Cal. Rptr. 465 (the existence of an "emergency" is not required to establish the legiti-
macy of rent control). 
157. [d. at 146, 550 P.2d at 1013, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 477. "It is the essence of the 
police power to impose reasonable regulations upon private property rights to serve the 
larger public good." [d. 
158. See supra note 16. 
159. [d. 
160. See D.N. MCCLOSKEY, THE ApPLIED THEORY OF PRICE 551 (1982). If one can 
obtain a lO~i, return on an investment in a tax free, risk free savings bond, but only a 
9~i, return from renting property (after tax benefits, risk, and information costs have 
been discounted), landlords would be effectively losing 1 % return; it would be irrational 
for them to continue in the rental business when their investment is worth more else-
where. [d. 
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relative to the returns being made from other investments.16l 
The court recognized this relationship, and suggested that, "[A] 
just and reasonable return on investment is one that is commen-
surate with returns on investments in other enterprises having 
comparable risks."162 Therefore, when the court referred to con-
fiscatory rates, it was referring to those rates that would en-
courage landlords to divest themselves of their rental properties 
and invest their monies elsewhere.16s 
This interpretation by the court of confiscatory rates, en-
ables landlords to challenge a local ordinance by using statistics 
that indicate the landlords' personal expenses and the returns 
being made in other industries with comparable risks. Although 
the landlords in Fisher raised challenges that were primarily 
based on a facial attack of the ordinance and not an attack of 
the ordinance as applied,164 it may still be possible to show that 
an ordinance is too inflexible on its face to allow for returns 
commensurate with other enterprises having comparable risks. 
The returns in other industries analysis, however, is proba-
bly more appropriate for an attack of an ordinance as applied. 
In most cases, a facial attack of an ordinance's rate of return 
standard will be, in itself, unadvisable unless the standard sets 
specific profit amounts. If an ordinance provides for specific 
rents and adjustments without sufficient flexibility, a landlord 
can then attack the ordinance as too inflexible to account for 
changing returns in other industries and the relative effect on 
rental properties. 
A more logical facial attack of an ordinance would be a chal-
lenge to the procedural process. In the area of procedural due 
process, the court seemed more willing to establish specific re-
quirements for the legislature.161i Although the Fisher court 
161. [d. If a person decides to operate a business in a vacuum, that person may 
decide that there is a minimum rate of return that would make the business worth his 
effort. [d. In a multi-business environment, however, an investor is interested in maxi-
mum returns, and therefore, achieving a maximum return relative to other industries 
with similar risks and information costs is what makes the business worth the effort. [d. 
162. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 683, 693 P.2d at 292, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 713. 
163. See supra notes 162 and 163. 
164. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 653-54, 693 P.2d at 270, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 691. 
165. [d. at 690-91, 693 P.2d at 298, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19 (pointing out defects 
caused by delays in the procedures for implementing rate adjustments). 
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would still attempt to uphold an ordinance's procedural mecha-
nism, the court has established certain requirements that could 
potentially be used to attack an ordinance in the future. For ex-
ample, as far as the rate adjustment mechanism in Berkeley's 
ordinance, the court ruled that it would strike down any ordi-
nance that caused a greater delay than was practically necessary 
to fulfill the ordinance's objective. ISS This decision has, in effect, 
mandated a general adjustment mechanism for certain cost in-
creases. lS7 Although the court upheld the procedural mecha-
nisms in Berkeley's ordinance, there is no reason why that par-
ticular challenge cannot be effective against other ordinances 
that potentially cause a greater delay. 
An example of how the court would continue to consider 
any explanation for the rationality of a procedural mechanism is 
the court's discussion of the rent withholding procedure. The 
court insisted that one of the rent withholding provisions in the 
Berkeley ordinance creates a "substantive defense to unlawful 
detainer actions as a means of ensuring compliance with the or-
dinance. "lS8 This provision has two sections: one providing for 
withholding to ensure compliance, and one creating a substan-
tive defense to an unlawful detainer if a tenant has acted in 
good faith.ls9 Significantly, the court determined from only one 
section in the provision that the rent withholding procedure is 
not procedural but is substantive.170 Since the court's interpeta-
tion was based upon the defense established by the provision, 
166. [d. at 687, 693 P.2d at 295, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716. 
167. [d. at 687, 693 P.2d at 296, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716. The court stated that a gen-
eral adjustment provision, "[W]i11 be required when the 'magnitude of the job to be 
done' so demands." [d. The court also upheld Berkeley's current ordinance, as opposed 
to the Birkenfeld ordinance, because it provided general adjustments for property tax 
and utility increases whereas the Birkenfeld ordinance did not. [d. at 690-91, 693 P.2d at 
298, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19. 
168. [d. at 704, 693 P.2d at 308, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 729. 
169. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 15(a)(I), (a)(2). For the text of the relevant rent 
withholding provision, see supra note 29. 
170. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 704, 693 P.2d at 308, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 729. One author 
explains that, "Although much ink has been spilled by courts and commentators in the 
attempt to separate questions of substance and process, the attempt can never be wholly 
successful because the questions are functionally inseparable. See J.L. MASHAW, DUE 
PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 5 (1985). In the area of substance, a significant 
process development occurs when the state is precluded from legislating in certain areas; 
here, the process of who decides is at the forefront. [d. In the procedural area, questions 
regarding who should decide an issue are fundamentally directed at what is to be de-
cided; the substantive result is the overriding concern of the parties. [d. 
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the court has provided drafters of rent control ordinances with a 
means of escaping a procedural due process challenge; they sim-
ply have to add a qualified defense to the rent withholding 
provision. 
B. PREEMPTION 
California's Constitution allows all cities and counties to 
make and enforce regulations and ordinances not in conflict with 
general laws. l7l Historically, it has been up to the courts to de-
cide what is meant by "in conflict with generallaws."172 Over the 
years, courts have recognized two situations that may involve a 
conflict between state and municipal legislation: when a state 
statute expressly prohibits local regulation in the area (or a mu-
nicipal regulation is duplicative of state law), and when a munic-
ipality imposes additional legislation in an area fully occupied 
by the state. l7a The Fisher decision demonstrates the court's 
preemption analysis in both of these areas. 
The retaliatory eviction presumption is an example of a reg-
ulation expressly prohibited by the state.174 According to the 
court, this presumption in the ordinance is directly preempted 
by one section in the Evidence Code.17& Part of this section pro-
vides, "Except as otherwise provided by law."l76 The crucial is-
sue in this area is the definition of "law" and its further refine-
ment into the term "statute,"177 and whether municipal 
ordinances fit into that definition. In order to determine whether 
a direct conflict exists between the language of a state statute 
and a local ordinance, the inquiry is one of statutory construc-
tion, semantics, and a consideration of certain factors such as 
custom. 
The court's analysis was an historical one that examined the 
relationship between the statutory code and local regulation 
171. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
172. See Comment, supra note 155, at 604. 
173. See id. at 604-05. 
174. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 697, 593 P.2d at 303, 209 Cal. Rptr at 724. 
175. [d. 
176. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 (West 1966). 
177. See id. § 160 (1966). 
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over time.178 As explained by the court, the Evidence Code has 
historically been an exclusive state affair; only the state can de-
termine the rules of evidence and interpret them.179 Since local 
ordinances cannot construe the rules of evidence, the Evidence 
Code exception for statutes does not apply to municipal ordi-
nances. This is a somewhat narrow view in contrast with other 
situations in which the courts have interpreted the term statute 
to include municipal ordinances.18o However, the court was satis-
fied that the legislature never intended to include local ordi-
nances within the definition of statute as it relates to the Evi-
dence Code. 
As far as the restraint on alienation of property issue, the 
court found that the term statute does include municipal ordi-
nances.l8l The court's rationale for this, however, was that prior 
decisions had never applied the Civil Code's restraint on aliena-
tion language to statutes or ordinances; this language had always 
been applied to private restraints.182 The court's historical anal-
ysis in these two areas indicates that unless precedent has estab-
lished that a statute was intended to exclude municipal ordi-
nances, the court will uphold an ordinance. This approach to 
direct preemption tends to relieve the court of personal respon-
sibility; it is probably a result of the court's general deference to 
economic legislation unless some actual conflict of purpose or 
treatment can be proved. 
The rent withholding provisions in the ordinance provide an 
example of direct preemption by duplicative legislation and pre-
emption by implication. In both areas, the court was concerned 
with three statutes introduced by the landlords.18s In general, 
legislation must be reasonable and appropriate to the needs of a 
particular locality.184 Since the court previously decided that the 
rent withholding provisions are reasonably related to the legiti-
mate needs of the city, the court only pointed to the distinctions 
178. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 698,693 P.2d at 303-04, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 724. 
179. [d. at 698, 693 P.2d at 304, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725. 
180. See City of Los Angeles v. Belridge Oil Co., 42 Cal. 2d 823, 833-34, 271 P.2d 5, 
15 (1954). See also King Mfg. Co. v. Augusta 277 U.S. 100, 102-14 (1928). 
181. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 693, 693 P.2d at 300, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 721. 
182. [d. at 693, 693 P.2d at 300, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 720-21. 
183. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
184. Natural Milk Producers Assn. v. City & County of San Francisco, 20 Cal. 2d 
101, 109, 124 P.2d 25, 29 (1942). 
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between the cited statutes and the relevant rent withholding 
provisions. 185 
The court determined that two of the statutes introduced 
by the landlords are additional legislation rather than duplica-
tive, and therefore, are not preemptive legislation.18G According 
to the court, the rent withholding provisions are a substantive 
defense to eviction suits and a means of enforcing the ordinance, 
and the cited statutes are unrelated to the rent withholding pro-
visions.187 The court determined that as additional legislation, 
neither the quantity nor the content of the cited statutes imply 
any legislative intent to exclude further regulation. 188 Further-
more, the court noted that the imposition of restraints in an 
area that is not covered by state law, i.e., defenses to eviction 
suits and enforcing compliance with ordinances, is a valid exer-
cise of the city's police power.189 
The one statute cited by the landlords that does relate to 
eviction suits was determined by the court to be unrelated to the 
rent withholding provisions. leo As explained by the court, this 
statute that defines unlawful detainer is procedural, whereas the 
ordinance creates a substantive defense to an unlawful detainer 
action. leI The court alleged that the "'mere fact that a city's 
exercise of the police power creates such a defense does not 
bring it into conflict with the state's statutory scheme.' "le2 On 
this basis, the court did not find a direct conflict. 
Due to the court's interpetation that the rent withholding 
provisions create a substantive defense to unlawful detainer, and 
that such a defense is not in conflict with statutory schemes re-
lating to unlawful detainer, the court dismissed the presence of 
185. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 704-09, 693 P.2d at 308-12, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 729-32. 
186. [d. at 707, 693 P.2d at 310, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 731 (§§ 1942 and 1947 of the Civil 
Code were found not to be preemptive legislation). 
187. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 707, 693 P.2d at 310, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 731. 
188. [d. 
189. [d. 
190. [d. at 706, 693 P.2d at 309-10, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 730 (§ 1161 of the Civil Proce-
dure Code was found to be procedural, whereas the provisions in the ordinance were 
found to create a substantive defense to an unlawful detainer action). 
191. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 707, 693 P.2d at 310, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 731. 
192. [d. (citing Birkenfield v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 149,550 P.2d 1016, 130 
Cal. Rptr. 480 (1976». 
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preemption by implication.193 Although courts have stressed that 
preemptive legislation may be evidenced by a· multiplicity of 
statutes or a single enactment,194 the Fisher court observed that 
the three statutes raised by the landlords are insufficient for this 
purpose.1911 
Only one of the three factors that determines whether an 
ordinance is preempted by implication could have applied; this 
factor considers whether an area that is partly covered by state 
law clearly indicates a paramount state concern that will not tol-
erate additional local action.196 Even if one could argue that the 
three cited statutes indicate a paramount state concern, the 
court's conclusion that the relevant rent withholding provisions 
are substantive defenses to eviction suits takes the ordinance 
completely out of the range of the three statutes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Fisher decision demonstrates the courts' strong defer-
ence to legislation regarding economic issues. The majority of 
due process challenges involve attempts to get courts to consider 
the real effect of a regulation in achieving its. intended purpose. 
However, these challenges fail because the intended purposes of 
regulations are subjective, and beyond the scope of the courts' 
"any conceivable rationale" approach in economic legislation. 
In Fisher, this deference by the courts also applied in the 
area of preemption uphold. Not only did the California Supreme 
Court uphold most of the provisions in the Berkeley rent control 
ordinance that were attacked by the Berkeley landlords on pre-
emption grounds, but the court also showed a creative disposi-
tion toward maintaining economic legislation. The court's deter-
mination that a rent withholding provision in the ordinance is a 
substantive defense to an unlawful detainer is surprising. To 
keep preemption in perspective, however, the court did rely on 
an historical analysis where nontraditional interpetation was 
unnecessary. 
193. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 709, 693 P.2d at 311, 209 Cal. Rptr, at 732. 
194. See In re Martin, 221 Cal. App. 2d 14, 17, 34 Cal. Rptr. 299, 301 (1963). 
195. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 709, 693 P.2d at 311, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 732. 
196. See supra note 145. 
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In both the due process and preemption areas, the court ap-
pears to have struck a balance between competing interests, al-
though in favor of the local regulation. Even though a standard 
due process analysis requires deference to economic legislation, 
the court did provide some limitations. Among these limitations 
are determinations by the court that long delays in rent adjust-
ments due to inflation are confiscatory, and that a fair return on 
investment requires a return commensurate with other indus-
tries with comparable risks. In the area of preemption, munici-
palities are limited from legislating in those areas traditionally 
occupied exclusively by the state. 
The balance established by the Fisher court seems to be a 
compromise between a greater deference in the area of preemp-
tion and a slightly heightened standard of reasonableness in the 
area of due process. Although the court demonstrated a creative 
disposition toward upholding local ordinances against preemp-
tion challenges, the court's decision suggests that landlords are 
entitled to profits sufficient to ensure their continued presence 
in the rental market. 
Scott T. Dunning* 
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